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Abstract
On 14 March 2017, the Oxford Business Law Blog (OBLB) marked its first anniversary. Since its
inception, it has published over 600 posts from academics and practitioners from across the world
and has reached readers from over 170 countries. The purpose of this collection is to celebrate
submissions created especially for publication on the OBLB: it comprises the ten most-read
opinion pieces published on the OBLB in its first year. Corporate scandals, law and technology,
and Brexit are the recurring themes.
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Introduction
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On 14 March 2017, the Oxford Business Law Blog (OBLB) marked its first anniversary. One year
ago, we set out to create a leading and truly international forum for the exchange of ideas and
reporting of new developments in business law. Since then, we have published over 600 posts from
academics and practitioners from across the world and have reached readers from over 170
countries.
The OBLB is now a firmly entrenched part of the Oxford Law Faculty’s Business Law
Hub. The OBLB is edited by Luca Enriques, Jennifer Payne (on leave), Kristin van
Zwieten and Horst Eidenmüller, with associate editors Clara Martins Pereira, Konstantinos
Sidiropoulos, and Thom Wetzer. Over the past year, Antonios Chatzivasileiadis, Philine
Scheer and Martin Bengtzen have also acted as associate editors.
We would like to thank our contributors and ever-growing readership, as well as our
sponsor Travers Smith, for their support and engagement. We look forward to another year of
interesting contributions and fascinating discussions.
The purpose of this collection is to celebrate submissions created especially for publication
on the OBLB. As such, this paper consists of a compilation of the ten most-read opinion pieces
published on the OBLB in its first year. Corporate scandals, law and technology, and Brexit are
the recurring themes. In this context, and for reasons of coherence and consistency, the pieces
included in this paper are arranged in a thematic order.

Horst Eidenmüller
Luca Enriques
Jennifer Payne
Kristin Van Zwieten

Oxford, 15 March 2017
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Volkswagen’s Emissions Scandal: Lessons for Corporate Governance?
(Part 1)
JOHN ARMOUR

Even hardened cynics were shocked by the revelations in September that Volkswagen had
programmed its diesel cars to defeat emissions tests. Whilst it was no secret that manufacturers
attempted to ‘game’ these tests, what was astonishing about VW’s behaviour was the scale and
method of their deceit. The technology VW used for cleansing Nitrous Oxide emissions entailed a
trade-off against fuel economy and performance, which VW’s engineers and programmers had
decided to manage by introducing two distinct driving ‘modes’ into the car’s software: a ‘best
behaviour’ mode that complied with US Nitrous Oxide emissions requirements, and another for
all other circumstances. The cars’ systems were smart enough to detect whether they were
undergoing the highly predictable and stylised requirements of the US Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA)’s tests, and to put themselves on best behaviour accordingly. The trade-offs were
significant, however: the cars emitted up to 40 times more Nitrous Oxide during normal
circumstances than under test conditions. About 500,000 vehicles were affected in the US,
spanning the model years 2009-16. The tactic was used in other markets as well, raising the total
number of affected vehicles to approximately 11 million worldwide.
Nitrous Oxides and particulates, a by-product of diesel combustion, are harmful for human
health. Some analysts suggest that the additional pollution from VW’s cars would have led to up
to 100 additional deaths in the US alone from respiratory-related illness. To bring this problem
home, note that 1.2 million affected cars were sold in the UK—more than twice as many as across
the entire US. It’s worth noting that annual average levels of Nitrogen Dioxide in Oxford High
Street are 25% above the maximum levels permitted by EU law and considered ‘safe’ according
to WHO guidelines.
At this point, it remains unclear precisely how and why VW came to do this. US law firm
Jones Day have been retained by VW to conduct an internal investigation, the results of which are
due in the fourth quarter of 2016. VW’s official line is that this was the result of the actions of a
few engineers and programmers. Let’s call this the ‘rogue technicians’ theory. However, with such
a large number of vehicles, over a period of about seven years, it seems—as was argued in a recent
post by J.S. Nelson—more plausible that senior management might have been aware of the scheme
(or warning signs of it) at some point prior to its revelation. Let’s call this the ‘management
inaction’ theory.
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Whether it was rogue technicians or management inaction, it appears likely that cost
savings were a key motivation. VW’s competitors in selling diesel cars into the US market, BMW
and Mercedes, developed a more expensive technology for cleansing diesel fumes of particulates
and Nitrous Oxide, known as urea filtering. By choosing not to license this technology from
Mercedes, analysts estimate VW could have saved up to $4.8bn worldwide.
Although this may seem a large sum, it is far smaller than VW’s likely losses as a result of
the scandal. VW faces a bevy of lawsuits from all over the world. Details of their expected quantum
emerged in late April from VW’s 2015 Annual Report and the announcement of an agreement in
principle regarding a settlement with US authorities and class-action lawyers, under which VW
reportedly agrees to repair or buy back the cars sold in the US with the illegal software, and to pay
additional compensation. There are still many uncertainties regarding liability, as the agreement
apparently only covers civil litigation in the US. In addition, the US Department of Justice has
opened a criminal investigation, and civil, criminal and/or administrative actions have been
commenced in many other countries.
VW’s 2015 Annual Report announced provisions totalling €16.4 billion ($18.4 billion) for
the clean-up and legal costs, including €7.0 billion ($8.0 billion) dollars for “legal risks” and a
further €1 billion ($1.2 billion) for contingent liabilities. VW also began a product recall in the EU
of cars sold with affected engines.
An interesting question is the extent to which, over and above the costs of liability, the
recall and lost sales of non-compliant vehicles, VW has suffered further reputational losses. In the
finance literature, ‘reputational losses’ are often taken to mean the cost to a company of people
being less willing to trade with it—for example, having to lower its prices to shift product, or raise
promised returns in order to raise capital. Such a shift can be triggered by the revelation of
information that shows the company has a propensity not to keep its promises. But prior literature
(Karpoff et al, 2005; Armour et al, 2010) finds that reputational effects of this sort are only
triggered where the firm is revealed to have harmed parties who trade with it: where the harm
imposes costs on third parties (e.g. the environment) then there is no stock price movement beyond
the amount of the expected legal liability.
VW’s stock price fell rapidly by 40% from its pre-scandal position, although it
subsequently regained ground, now wavering at just under 20% down. This suggests the market’s
estimate of VW’s likely losses is similar to the firm’s provisions, at around $18 billion. As a result,
it doesn’t seem that VW’s case bucks the trend of purely environmental harms (as opposed to
uncompensated harms to customers) not triggering reputational losses.
Given these losses, cheating was clearly a very bad thing for VW to do from an ex post
perspective. But what about ex ante? This really depends on expectations about the probability of
getting caught, and attitudes to risk. Consider first the (highly implausible) idea that the decision
to cheat was in fact deliberately taken by management, assuming that the benefit was $5bn and the
costs were $18bn. This would have a positive expected return for VW provided that the probability
of getting caught was less than approximately 25%. Now consider the (much more plausible)
position of a CEO who has a whiff that something may be amiss amongst junior engineers. He can
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either pursue an internal investigation, which will alienate engineers and may reveal wrongdoing.
Or he can do nothing and press on regardless. The problem is that an internal investigation will
surely increase the likelihood that the firm will get caught for any prior misconduct. If the CEO
judges the initial probability of getting caught to be low, it is easy to see that it may maximise
expected profits to turn a blind eye, rather than draw attention to a potential problem.
Of course, executives are risk averse, and so the option of cheating will seem less attractive.
Nobody wants to lose their job under a cloud, or what is worse, face potential personal liability for
criminal or negligent misconduct. This provides a nice introduction to the challenging questions
the VW case poses for corporate governance. Why was it that risk-averse individuals amongst the
management might have failed to investigate potential smoking guns? My second post on VW will
further comment on the corporate governance implications of the emissions scandal and provide
my answer to this question.

Date of Publication: 17 May 2016
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Volkswagen’s Emissions Scandal: Lessons for Corporate Governance?
(Part 2)
JOHN ARMOUR

In Part 1 of this post, I posed the question why risk-averse managers at VW might have failed to
launch an internal investigation into any potential smoking guns during the company’s prolonged
and extensive emissions cheating. The answer, I would hazard, has to do with high-powered
incentives. We tend to think of these as being a peculiarly problematic feature of Anglo-American
corporations, with dispersed share ownership. In these firms, high-powered incentives in the form
of heavily performance-related pay are conventionally deployed as a way of encouraging managers
to be less risk averse with respect to business decision-making. The ‘performance’ criterion is
normally defined by reference to the stock price, and it is ‘high powered’ because it responds
aggressively to changes in the criterion. This is known to give rise to problems when it comes to
compliance with corporate obligations imposed for purposes other than to maximise shareholder
value: think of Enron, or banks prior to the financial crisis.
What the VW case exposes is that high powered incentives can be linked to compliance
problems, even in firms that do not ostensibly have a culture of pursuing ‘shareholder value’. Like
all large German firms, VW had a two-tier board structure. VW’s CEO, Martin Winterkorn, had a
pay package that was heavily tilted towards variable pay. In 2014, he took home €16m ($18.3m),
of which only €2m ($2.3m), or 12.5%, was fixed compensation. The heavy tilting towards
performance related pay was common across members of VW’s Vorstand, or Management Board.
While executives’ variable pay was not tied directly to the share price, it was linked closely to a
number of metrics including operating profits, sales growth, customer satisfaction and employee
productivity and satisfaction. This is consistent with the publicly-announced goal for VW for many
years, namely growth: the goal was to make VW the largest car maker by sales in the world, which
it ironically achieved in the first half of 2015, only to lose again in the wake of the scandal.
Financial incentives were not the only high-powered incentives acting upon senior VW
executives. There will also have been intensive monitoring by the Aufsichtsrat, or Supervisory
Board. Unlike an Anglo-American corporations’ boards, German supervisory boards are staffed
with representatives of major shareholders and labour. Thus VW’s Aufsichtsrat of 21 had 5
members appointed by the Porsche family, the controlling shareholder, 2 appointed by the Qatar
Sovereign wealth fund (which holds a 17% stake), 2 appointed by the state of Lower Saxony
(holding a 20% stake), 10 appointed by employees, trade unions, and middle management. The
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other two comprised the Supervisory Board’s venerable former Chairman, and a single
independent. Growth was an ambition that pleased both stakeholder groups dominating the
Aufsichtsrat, the controlling shareholders and the employees
Astonishingly, the bias toward performance pay was shared by VW’s Aufsichtsrat. The
Chair of the Aufsichtsrat, until April 2015 Ferdinand Piëch, took home €1.5m in 2014, of which Page | 9
only €200,000 (13%) was fixed; this ratio was similar across the entire Aufsichtsrat. The
Aufsichtsrat’s variable pay is expressly linked by §17 of VW’s Satzung, or Articles of Association,
to shareholder dividends.
Although European executives are usually thought to earn less than their counterparts in
the US, it is notable that Winterkorn’s package was very similar to the total amount earned by
Mark Fields, the CEO of Ford ($18.6m) and more than that of Mary Barra, the CEO of GM
($16.2m), in the same year. Financial incentives and close monitoring of performance are likely
additive in terms of their impact on executive behaviour. Thus the intensity of the combined
incentives might have been even stronger than those faced by a US executive. In short, highpowered incentives can give rise to perverse incentives in firms without dispersed share ownership,
and where performance targets are not defined solely by reference to the share price.
What also emerges starkly from the VW affair is the importance of distinguishing between
agency costs and externalities in discussions of corporate governance. Conflicts of interest between
managers and shareholders are an agency cost. But so too are conflicts of interest between
employees and shareholders. Harm caused to the environment, or any other interest external to the
corporation, however, is an externality. Simply because a company’s structure is designed—as
codetermination does in Germany—to minimise agency costs between shareholders and
employees—does not necessarily imply that it will be less problematic in terms of externalities.
Corporate conduct that harms the environment but leads to corporate growth benefits both
investors and employees.
What, then, are the implications for corporate governance? There are clearly lessons to be
learned about the appropriate use of high powered incentives. However, the most striking
implication would seem to be the need for effective personal liability for individuals who either
deliberately engage in misconduct, or who fail to ensure the implementation of sufficient risk
management. The former, which would be criminal liability, is already in place in most
jurisdictions, but suffers from serious problems of proof. The latter, however, which would take
the form of negligence based liability, could usefully be strengthened.
Where the probability of detection of misconduct is low, then personal liability for
managers is an important way to counteract excessively high powered incentives. Such liability,
where breaches of the law are concerned, suffers from none of the standard objections that motivate
the business judgment rule in the US and other jurisdictions, including Germany. Decisions to
break the law are not business decisions; decisions to engage in oversight to ensure that
lawbreaking is not occurring within the firm, are not business decisions. They attract the duty of
care. However, it should be clear that any such liability should have a reasonable chance of
attracting ex post judicial scrutiny of managerial oversight, and that any such liability should not
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be insurable. The corporate laws of many jurisdictions do not yet go this far. Insurance is routine.
In Germany and the UK, it is clear that liability would be available on a negligence standard, but
the chances of a lawsuit being brought have been, at least so far, slim. In a case of oversight failure,
this would normally be a problem that the board as a whole might be implicated for. This in turn
implies a decision to litigate is unlikely, absent a change of control or a derivative action. The bars
to derivative actions in Europe are still too high for these to amount to an effective deterrent. In Page | 10
Delaware, where shareholder litigation is much easier to launch, the duty of oversight is only ever
framed in terms of good faith, and were it to go further, would be subject to routine waiver under
DGCL §102(b)(7).
Another possibility might be to contemplate public enforcement of directors’ duties under
these circumstances. This model is adopted in Australia, where ASIC has power to enforce
directors’ private law duties.
All this presupposes some guidance as to what sort of actions such oversight should
involve. Here we move into the realm of ‘risk management’. The VW case has some very
interesting pointers about this too. The striking thing about the VW case is how the actions of a
small number of technical personnel can lead to harms affecting 11 million vehicles. The deceit
was perpetrated through software—through code. A modern premium car is a particularly complex
piece of software, containing over 100 million lines of code—compare that to 50 million for the
Large Hadron collider, or 60 million for all the code in Facebook. The more that the execution of
corporate activity shifts from humans to software, the more the focus of risk management must be
on those who design and authorise the code. In short, going forwards, the selection, training,
compensation and oversight of programmers and software development should probably be a
central feature of risk management, with respect to compliance with external obligations, in any
industry.

Date of Publication: 18 May 2016
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Douglass North and Brazil’s “Car Wash” Scandal
BRUNO MEYERHOF SALAMA
Douglass North, winner of the 1993 Nobel Prize in economics, passed away late last year at the
age of 95. North was noted for advancing the theory that institutions—which he referred to as a
society’s “rules of the game”—are critical for the functioning of the economy. His defence of the
fortification of mechanisms for upholding contracts and property laws is now well known. Not as
famous, however, is his equally insightful theory of the dynamics of institutional evolution in
societies. This lesser known line of thinking allows us to engage in useful reflection about the
current imbroglios gripping Brazil’s bustling democracy.
North’s reflections on institutional evolution hold “social order” as the foundational
concept. Formulated late in his career, his considerations were consolidated in his last major book,
Violence and Social Orders: A Conceptual Framework for Interpreting Recorded Human History,
published in 2009 in co-authorship with Barry Weingast and John Wallis. In a country with a
“limited access” social order, the political system manipulates the economic system so that elites
can rent-seek and block access by non-elites to economic opportunity. In such countries,
appearances can be deceiving. Formally speaking, there may be a tripartite distribution of power,
professional state bureaucracies, and elections by private ballot. The restrictions to access,
however, are largely informal, and arise because the dominant structure in society is personal
interaction rather than impersonal laws. In these settings, stability is achieved through the
collaboration and exchange of favours among the political elite and the economic plutocracy.
Corruption small and large, both inside and outside bureaucracy, is pervasive. When everyone has
an implicit glass ceiling, cooperation is better than competition.
By contrast, in a country with an “open access” social order the basic dynamics of wealth
creation and the allocation of power are not based on exchange of favours, but on political
opposition and the race to create innovations that generate economic progress. No group is able to
impose its will over the others unilaterally, so a balance of political power prevents state
appropriation by any one group. Even if each group constantly attempts to take control over the
public sphere, none of them is strong enough to do so in a decisive manner. The groups monitor
each other, and when conflict emerges the impasse is overcome not by exchanging new privileges
within the elite but by creating new impersonal rules. Existing institutions and beliefs prevent the
emergence of violence and create stability, paving the way for the consolidation of the rule of law.
This is where North's theory intersects with the striking facts that have now become public
through the “Lava Jato” (literally, Car Wash) scandal and related investigations ongoing in Brazil.
2016-2017 Oxford Business Law Blog Round-Up: Most Read Opinion Pieces

In 2014, in the course of an ordinary police investigation into money laundering through a chain
of gas stations and laundries, the Federal Police came across evidence of multi-billion dollar
corruption at the state-controlled oil giant, Petrobras. Evidence has emerged of a regimented
scheme of institutionalised corruption and money laundering involving high-level politicians,
Petrobras officers, and businessmen from some of Brazil’s largest private companies who
conspired for years to supply Petrobras with overpriced goods and services. The alleged kickbacks Page | 12
from Petrobras were used to finance political campaigns and to bribe government officials.
So far, more than 50 politicians have been implicated, including former President Lula da
Silva, the president of the Brazilian Senate, the president of the Chamber of Deputies, and the
treasurer of the ruling Workers’ Party (PT). In the midst of an economic downturn, this corruption
scandal has snowballed and paralysed the Brazilian political system, also blocking the (as yet
timid) attempts by President Dilma Rousseff to address the country’s growing budgetary deficit.
Even if impeachment procedures recently initiated in Congress against President Rousseff
eventually fail, social unrest and political fatigue strongly suggest that this fourth consecutive
presidential term of office of the PT in power will be the last.
So a new party will come to power. What then? There are at least two possibilities. The
first is pessimistic: everything will return to the way it has always been. Any eventual political
changes will be cosmetic and limited, because in a country like Brazil, the more things change, the
more they remain the same. Decades ago, dictatorship was to be blamed; now it is the election
cycles. Thanks to the electoral cycles of reinstated democracy, there is an urgency to steal more,
as election campaigns are expensive; and to steal more quickly, because the timeframe to fill the
coffers is tighter. Everything is counterintuitive: greater risk of police detection and legal
consequences will translate into bigger bribes, driving good men away from politics and instead
attracting opportunists. Perhaps the result then in Brazil would be a repeat of the Italian Operation
Clean Hands from some years back. In Italy, a whole political class was liquidated, but it seems
that the rules of the game have not changed and everything has returned to the status quo. In short,
nothing will improve for us in Brazil: our politics are doomed to be based on privilege; our society,
on backwardness; our democracy, on illusion.
The alternative reading is more hopeful, and a Northian perspective helps understand why.
Democracy–which is first and foremost a competition for power through votes – will work as
intended. The road will be long, but a decisive step will have been taken if the race for power helps
reduce, rather than expand, corruption. Despite the impositions of the electoral cycles and the need
to finance election campaigns, crime typically does not pay when state organisations work
tolerably well. Those in power today will no longer be there tomorrow, so they must take heed
and walk straight and narrow–not for fear of political persecution but out of fear of the application
of the rule of law. Therefore, the logic goes, the risks of legal action and punishment will gradually
render the practice of corruption not only immoral (which it has always been), but also contrary to
the self-interest of those in power. If this were to occur, the political culture would change, and
then, perhaps with some luck, it would be possible to rein in populism and reform the Republic
step by step, re-setting the existing rules based on a spirit of dialogue, compromise and a vision of
a more prosperous future.

2016-2017 Oxford Business Law Blog Round-Up: Most Read Opinion Pieces

North recognised that institutional changes do not necessarily come quickly, may not be
successful, and are subject to setbacks of all kinds. But if there is a possible optimistic reading
amid the current havoc in Brazil, it is that operations such as Car Wash are part of a process of
institutional advancement and a growing openness of the social order. If all goes well, then the
current political impasse, rising unemployment, brutal economic recession and increasing poverty
will in the future be recast as the bitter price that Brazilian society had to pay in its path toward the Page | 13
establishment of the rule of law. To be sure, no society can be reformed only by police action, and
whether the desired institutional improvements will in fact ensue from the current scandal is yet
unclear. But in a country with as much potential as Brazil there is a lot to be gained by
implementing reforms that will pave the way for prosperity. The size of our challenges suggests
caution, but at this point a little hope might do us Brazilians good.

Date of Publication: 21 March 2016
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The Rise of the Machines – How Automated Digital Assistants Can Reduce
Competition (and the Cash in Your Wallet)
ARIEL EZRACHI & MAURICE STUCKE

Who wouldn’t want a personal digital butler? Many of us already benefit from basic digital
assistants such as Google Assistant, Apple’s Siri, Facebook’s M, and Amazon.com’s Alexa. The
future heralds faster, smarter and more human-like versions that can transform the way we access
information (in suggesting restaurants, news stories, hotels, and shopping sites) and communicate.
But as we welcome these intelligent, voice-activated helpers to our homes, we may not recognize
their toll on our well-being.
As we shift from a mobile-dominated world to an AI-dominated platform, our digital butler
will increasingly control our mundane household tasks, like regulating room temperature,
adjusting our water heater and playing our favourite music. It will be harder to turn our butler off.
Moreover, it will be tempting to increasingly rely on the butler for other activities, such as the
news we receive, the shows we watch, and the things we buy. The more we communicate primarily
with our personal assistant, the less likely we will independently search the web, read independent
customer reviews, use multiple price-comparison websites, and rely on other tools. We will entrust
our butler to undertake this effort and report its results. In relying on our butler, we become less
aware of outside options.
That increase reliance on the digital assistant (and provider’s online platform) is the Holy
Grail for the super-platforms, which provide us with the digital butlers. Their aim is to increase
the time we spend on their platform and to control as many aspects of our online interface.
Take, for example, the Google assistant, which forms part of the company’s ‘effort to
further entrench itself in users’ daily lives by answering users’ queries directly rather than pointing
them to other sources.’ Likewise, Facebook, through its digital assistant – M – seeks to replace
most of our web searches and apps with a function within Facebook Messenger. As our personal
assistant becomes our default, so too will its operating platform’s applications and functions.
Thus the intent is for the digital butler (and the platform on which it operates) to become
our key gateway to the World Wide Web. But in controlling this interface and accessing our
communications and data, the gatekeeper could also abuse its significant market power.
For instance, the digital butler may help the platform refine its profile about us, including
our likely reservation price, use of outside options, shopping habits, general interests, and
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weaknesses (including moments when our willpower is fatigued). This information can enable
‘behavioural discrimination’, where the platform can facilitate our buying products that we
otherwise wouldn’t, at prices closer to our reservation price. The more we rely on the butler, the
less likely we will be aware of this discrimination. Even if we search the web, the ads, products,
or search results we see may be orchestrated by our butler.
While providing us with a distorted view of available options and market reality, our trusted
butler can also exclude rivals. When the butler promotes its affiliated products and services, it
may become harder and costlier for retailers unaffiliated with the platform’s advertising business
to reach us. Even when the retailer can gain our attention, the personal assistant may interject with
its own recommendation, suggesting a special deal by a member of its platform’s ecosystem. In
this multisided market, the assistant may subtly push certain products and services and degrade or
conceal others, all in the name of personalization.
Rather than deter such abuses, market forces, given the data-driven network effects, can
actually increase entry barriers. The strong platforms (and their butlers) become even stronger,
extracting even more personal data, and commanding even higher rents to allow others to target
us. Not only will our pocketbooks be affected. Our political and social discourse could also be
manipulated, as we increasingly rely on our butler for our news and entertainment. The gatekeeper
could subtly, but effectively, intellectually capture its users in this unique bubble –– where users
happily roam, unaware of the outside market for products, services and ideas.
For a more detailed discussion, see our new book ‘Virtual Competition: The Promise and Perils of
the Algorithm-Driven Economy’.

Date of Publication: 5 October 2016
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Smart Contracts: Bridging the Gap Between Expectation and Reality
CHENG LIM, CALUM SARGEANT, & TJ SAW
There has been an explosion of interest in ‘smart contracts’ and blockchain technology over the
past two years, with software developers, financial institutions, regulators, and law firms rushing
in to explore smart contract design and blockchain development. The hype over smart contracts
has resulted in headlines such as ‘Blockchain “smart contracts” to disrupt lawyers’, and
speculation that blockchain smart contract technology ‘threatens thousands of legal jobs and
lawyers' role in intermediating commercial negotiations and disputes’.
Advocates of the technology are excited by the potential for smart contracts to encode and
perform complex agreements automatically. The dream is to build a contract from a code library
which will be stored on a blockchain, signed digitally and which will set in motion an irrevocable
set of instructions that will be automatically executed, subject to clearly pre-defined
exceptions. To commercial parties, the appeal of smart contracts lie in (i) the digitisation of trust
through certainty of execution, and in (ii) the creation of efficiency through the removal of
intermediaries and the costs they bring to transactions.
There is little doubt that smart contracts will find compelling use cases and achieve those
objectives in many instances. But equally, it is important to realise the limitations of smart
contracts and understand that there are many elements of contractual relations that are not suitable
for performance through deterministic computer logic embodied in a smart contract. If there are
unrealistic expectations for what the technology can achieve, early adopters may find that they
frustrate, rather than simplify, their dealings with others.
We set out in this article to define an appropriate role for smart contracts (whether on a
public or consortium blockchain), and to provide a model for designing smart contracts which can
operate effectively and safely in a world which is full of uncertainty, ambiguity and that is not
deterministic.
A smart contract is not everything
The term ‘smart contract’ is a misnomer. A smart contract shares theoretical similarities with a
legal contract, in the sense that they are both frameworks for regulating the interaction between
different entities, but it is important to note where those similarities start and end.
A smart contact is, at its heart, a computer programme – encoded logic that receives certain
inputs and executes a set of instructions to reach one of many pre-defined outcomes. It is not
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relevant to the encoded logic whether or not promises or consideration exist between the parties,
or whether or not representations have been made in relation to the subject matter of the
instructions. It is not relevant whether its instructions were intended or legal. At its heart, a smart
contract simply guarantees execution of a particular code base.
A normal, non-smart, or ‘dumb’ contract, on the other hand, is an agreement between two or Page | 17
more parties characterised by mutual promises or obligations, and is enforceable by law. A dumb
contract can be thought of as serving multiple and possibly interlocking goals:


setting a database of obligations – a contract serves as a catalogue of the mutual
obligations and promises between two or more parties. It is a collection of negotiated points
relating to a particular agreement between the parties, stated in language that parties can
refer to and at least in theory understand. Even so, there are many situations in which
courts have to determine what the parties agreed, or intended to agree, in their contract,
which has led to rules of law such as the parol evidence rule, and the implication of terms
into contracts which are ‘so obvious, that they go without saying’;



regulating the relationship between contracting parties – a contract is given legal effect
by the surrounding framework of laws in which the contract sits, thus ensuring that parties
are held to their obligations. The legal framework elevates an agreement from a moral
obligation to an obligation that is recognised and enforced by society at large. The law of
the relevant jurisdiction may compel performance of the obligation (as in the case of an
order for specific performance or injunction) and may incentivise performance by
penalising breach. Alternatively, the external legal framework may allow for a
modification of the obligations in the contract if, for example, there is a need to imply an
additional term into the contract. And of course, the legal framework may allow the
contract to be completely voided if, for example, there is illegality or a total failure of
consideration; and



providing part of the execution mechanism – a contract may also contain elements of a
mechanism by which contractual obligations can be executed. Wrapping an obligation in
the cloak of contract creates an expectation of performance supported by the external legal
framework, giving rise to an ‘execution norm’. The prospect of legal enforcement that
attaches to a contract, as opposed to a moral obligation, increases confidence that the
obligation will be performed.

How does a smart contract compare to a dumb contract?
While a smart contract may contain some part of the ‘database of obligations’ between the parties
in its instructions, it is unlikely to be a comprehensive catalogue of all those obligations,
particularly where the contractual obligations are complex. This is because:


parties may negotiate terms that are not capable of being assessed deterministically by a
computer program (that is, not capable of Boolean expression and an algorithmic
determination, but instead requiring human judgement);
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in order to be sufficiently expressive, obligations may import indeterminate concepts of
reasonableness or appropriateness that again are not suited to algorithmic determination;



the expression of an obligation in code may not accurately reflect the agreement between
the parties (for example because of error or omission); and



the contract may itself contain a further agreement to agree, or a mechanism for amending
the contract which is not in itself algorithmically deterministic.

Of course, a smart contract is clearly part of the execution mechanism. In fact, it is possible for the
smart contract to be the entire execution mechanism, and not just an element of it. The execution
norm established by a dumb contract could be replaced by the execution norm of irrevocable
instructions of a smart contract that guarantees performance. This ‘guaranteed execution’ of
encoded obligations is the key feature of a blockchain smart contract.
Smart contracts operate without reference to any external legal framework, in that
execution or performance of the obligations in the smart contract happens independently of the
surrounding legal framework. However, this does not prevent that legal framework from applying
to and affecting the broader contractual relationship between the parties. It is possible that the law
may mandate an outcome which is different to that which is programmed into the smart contract,
for example in order to correct a misrepresentation which is embodied in the code of the smart
contract.
In other words, smart contracts do not exist in a vacuum. Leaving aside the inability of smart
contracts to document obligations which are not algorithmically deterministic, those who wish to
use or establish smart contracts will have to deal with issues which have existed for many years in
the ‘dumb’ world. These are issues such as:


What if the code base does not reflect what the parties understood to be their agreement
(eg a common mistake of law or fact)?



What if the effect of the code base was represented by a party to be different to what it
actually was (eg a misrepresentation)?



What if one party did not have the legal capacity to enter into the smart contract (eg being
under age)?

Particular challenges with public blockchain smart contracts
One particular new issue is the design of smart contracts which sit on a public blockchain and
which interact with different and possibly hostile actors with misaligned incentives. These smart
contracts need not only to deal with the challenges referred to above, but to also incorporate
principles of defensive programming as well as analysis of the underlying game theoretic design.
In particular, it is imperative for a public smart contract to:


have its scripting language compile properly into its machine language, in the way it was
intended;
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be structured in a way which is computationally efficient (making use of the fewest state
changes to achieve the desired outcome) as it is expensive to devote computational
resources over the blockchain to run a program; and



be robust in its design so that malicious actors may not exploit weaknesses in the code to
‘stalk’ or ‘spam’ the contract and prevent its legitimate intended uses from being executed. Page | 19

This is more than a theoretical possibility, as illustrated by the recent events surrounding the smart
contracting public blockchain network Ethereum and the Distributed Autonomous Organisation
(DAO) smart contract that sat on it. The DAO was a smart contract intended to pool investment
funds (which, at one point, totalled $150M worth of the cryptocurrency ‘Ether’) which could be
allocated by members of the DAO to different projects. A hacker spotted a mistake in the
programming of the smart contract, and utilised it to drain the Ether from the DAO into child
DAOs controlled by the hacker. Importantly, the underlying Ethereum blockchain and smart
contract both functioned in the pre-determined way in which they were designed, but the failure
of proper smart contract design created a functional vulnerability which ultimately undermined the
intent of the DAO.
A model for designing smart contracts
We start from the proposition that a contract is not a set of irrevocable instructions but rather a
collection of mutual obligations subject to the overlay of law. A smart contract is a set of
instructions that may give effect to the obligations of the parties, but it must also be amenable to
rectification where it no longer satisfies the requirements of law or fails to reflect the obligations
agreed by the contracting parties. Where a smart contract is designed in a way that cannot achieve
this, it may result in misalignment between rights recognised by law and rights recognised by the
public.
Looked at in this light, a smart contract is really best suited as an execution mechanism for
a set of deterministic obligations, rather than as a contract in itself. In some ways, it is similar to
an ‘escrow’ mechanism which is common in M&A transactions, where money is paid to a trusted
third party stakeholder, and which can be released to one or the other party in certain specific,
determined circumstances. The smart contract is part of the contractual matrix between the parties
and is the mechanism by which execution of certain obligations is guaranteed.
We consider the following to be an appropriate model for designing and implementing ‘smart
contracts’:


there should be a dumb contract between the parties, in the form of a ‘legal wrapper’ which
sets out terms of the contract which are not deterministic and not suitable for execution
through the smart contract. An example of this would be a right to terminate a contract or
take a particular action because of the occurrence of a ‘material adverse event’;



the smart contract code must be designed to execute elements of the contract suited to
algorithmic determination, for example an obligation to pay an amount of money at a fixed
time, or a process for determining an interest rate by reference to a margin and a particular
published reference rate such as LIBOR;
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the legal wrapper should incorporate the smart contract code by reference into the contract,
but the dumb contract should take priority over the code if there was some conflict between
the two;



there should be a ‘fail-safe’ in the smart contract code that allows the code to be terminated
in certain agreed scenarios by any party to the contract (eg, by trusted authorities with Page | 20
multi-signatory keys). Consequences of the use of the ‘fail-safe’ (whether appropriate or
not) would be resolved by the parties in accordance with the legal wrapper and within the
framework of the law. The ‘fail-safe’ could also allow parties to amend the smart contract
code when there is a contract variation, or where a party chooses to waive certain rights
under the contract.

We posit that smart contracts are unlikely to make lawyers extinct. In fact, lawyers are going to
be just as important for society moving forward to make sure that smart contracts, like dumb
contracts, reflect the intention of the parties, and allow for the execution of agreed outcomes.

Date of Publication: 11 July 2016
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Brexit to the European Economic Area: What Would It Mean?
JOHN ARMOUR
As the dust clears from the result of the UK’s referendum on EU membership, new Prime Minister
Theresa May and her team must begin serious consideration of the options open to the UK. Two
issues are likely to sit at the heart of the UK’s negotiation.
First, there is an economic imperative to preserve the operation of the financial services
sector. UK-authorised financial firms currently enjoy a ‘passport’ to operate throughout the EU
without additional authorisation. Loss of the EU ‘passport’ would damage not only intra-EU
financial services exports, but also reduce the willingness of third country (especially US) firms to
base European operations in the UK. According to TheCityUK, financial and related professional
services account for 7% of domestic employment (two-thirds of whom work outside London),
12% of UK GDP and 12% of UK tax revenues. The EU is the largest export market for UK
financial services. Its loss could be an economic disaster for the UK.
Second, in light of the significance attached to concerns about immigration in the
referendum campaigning, there is a political imperative to secure a change to the terms on which
immigrants are able to enter the UK. These two desiderata are widely thought to be incompatible:
EU officials and senior politicians in other Member States have publicly opined that the EU’s
framework is not available a la carte: we must take free movement or leave financial services.
What, then, are the options for the UK?
To date, consideration of alternatives to the EU has revolved around three possibilities
popularly known as the ‘Norway’, ‘Swiss’ and ‘Canada’ models. The so-called ‘Norway model’
would involve re-joining the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) and becoming a party to
the European Economic Area (EEA). Ironically, EFTA membership would be a round-trip for the
UK, which was the prime mover behind the establishment of EFTA in 1960 as an economicallyoriented framework for trade liberalisation between European countries, in contrast to the EEC’s
more politically-oriented approach. Yet over the years, EFTA increasingly became seen as a
‘waiting room’ for EU membership, from which most of its original member states subsequently
graduated. Today there are just four EFTA members: Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, and
Switzerland.
A key difference from the EU is that EFTA is not a customs union. This means that, while
EFTA members agree to waive tariffs on goods and services amongst themselves, they do not
agree a common policy in relation to trade with third countries. This would open the possibility,
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for example, to more favourable trade terms with Commonwealth countries, as was the case prior
to the UK’s accession to the EEC in 1973. Nevertheless, EFTA does negotiate shared free trade
agreements with third countries on behalf of its members, which the UK would be free to join or
not as it wished.
The most important such agreement is the 1994 European Economic Area (‘EEA’) Page | 22
Agreement, which governs relations between three EFTA members (Switzerland opted out) and
the EU. The EEA entails acceptance of the EU’s four freedoms: goods, persons, services and
capital. Moreover, the EEA requires contracting parties to implement as part of their ‘internal legal
order’ the vast majority of the EU’s acquis (as set out in the 22 Annexes to the EEA Agreement),
save for the Common Agricultural Policy, the Customs Union, the Common Trade Policy, the
Common Foreign and Security Policy, Justice and Home Affairs, and the European Monetary
Union.
As regards financial services, the EEA-relevant EU measures include those pertaining to
company law and financial services. As a result, were the UK to become a party to the EEA, UKauthorised financial services firms would keep their ‘passport’ to market products and services
throughout the EU. Moreover, UK-registered companies founded by entrepreneurs in other EU
member states (of which there may be upwards of 100,000) would continue to have their existence
recognised by other EU jurisdictions.
However, there are two significant drawbacks to an EEA version of the ‘passport’, as
opposed to the EU version. First, the UK would no longer get any say over the content of the rules.
As a member of the EU, the UK has been a highly influential participant in the legislative process.
In particular, the EU’s early 21st century reforms on securities markets owed much to UK thinking,
and the UK has been a vocal opponent of some post-crisis measures it views as overkill.
Second, the ‘transplantation’ of EU legislation into the laws of EEA members is not
automatic; rather, members must each consent to enact it into their domestic laws. This can lead
to a lag between the enactment of EU laws and their EEA adoption. There have been particular
problems with post-crisis EU financial regulation. The new European System of Financial
Supervision (‘ESFS’), introduced in 2010, established EU-level agencies with delegated authority
to write binding rules. Implementing this creates constitutional difficulties for some EEA
members, and although the matter is a priority for the EFTA Standing Committee, it has not yet
been resolved. Because the ESFS is embedded in all subsequent financial services regulations
produced by the EU, virtually none of the EU’s post-crisis financial regulation is yet applicable in
non-EU EEA signatories. Indeed, the majority of the EU legislation in the ‘holding pattern’ status
of ‘identified as EEA-relevant but not yet adopted’ consists of financial services measures.
Financial services regulation in the EU has moved quickly since the financial crisis. If UK
firms have no say in the direction of that process, and cannot be guaranteed the application of the
latest measures, then the current EEA model will not be suitable for the fast-changing regulatory
challenges of the financial sector. This means that if the UK seeks to sign up to the EEA, it would
need to ensure at least some mechanism to improve implementation speed for financial services
measures and ideally some process for securing UK input to the rules. This would be in both sides’
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interests, because regardless of EU membership, their financial sectors will continue to be
interwoven as a practical matter, posing a mutual source of potential systemic risk.
The EEA therefore does not look a promising avenue for the UK. Straightforwardly
applied, it would involve no additional immigration control and a greatly enfeebled version of the
financial services passport. Of course, the UK might try to negotiate exceptions to the EEA’s free Page | 23
movement parameters: Liechtenstein, for example, obtained a five-year transitional period.
However, the UK’s prospects for such an ‘EEA minus’ deal seem distinctly unpromising, given
the risk to the EU of setting a precedent that other member states might follow. More concerning
for the UK is the risk that other EU member states, jealous of London’s success in financial
services, might offer an ‘EEA minus’ version that permitted the UK to opt out of free movement
but tore up the passport for financial services.
What, then, of the other options? The ‘Swiss’ and ‘Canadian’ models each refer to bilateral
agreements between these countries and the EU, which could provide templates for a bilateral UKEU deal. The bundle of bilateral measures between Switzerland and the EU cover free trade in
goods, but not services, and also require Switzerland to accept the free movement of EU citizens.
This configuration would clearly be unappealing to UK voters, as indeed it now appears to be to
the Swiss. In contrast, the recently-negotiated Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement
(‘CETA’) between Canada and the EU, encompasses not only goods but a wide range of services,
and does not entail any commitment on Canada’s part to free movement of persons. However, its
provisions on financial services (Chapter 13) do not extend anywhere near the ‘passport’
recognition enjoyed by firms authorised within the EU. Brexit optimists might argue that the UK
might be in a stronger negotiating position even than Canada and so able to achieve an even better
result. Yet it should be remembered that CETA has taken seven years to negotiate, that any bespoke
agreement with the UK would be at least as complex, and that EU member states would have
concerns about precedent-setting which would not have applied to Canada. Uncertainty blights
investment, and uncertainty of the extent and duration entailed by such a negotiation could easily
be fatal for much of the UK’s financial services sector.

Date of Publication: 19 July 2016
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Brexit Negotiation Games
HORST EIDENMÜLLER
The UK has voted by a slim majority to leave the European Union. How is this going to
happen? What will be the negotiation strategy of the UK, on the one hand, and the European
Union, on the other hand? The ensuing ‘Brexit Negotiation Games’ will be heavily influenced by
Article 50 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU). This provision sets out the legal process for
withdrawal from the Union. The process is initiated by a Member State’s notification to the
European Council of its intention to withdraw (Art 50(2)). Following such notification, a
‘withdrawal agreement’ shall be negotiated between the Council (of the European Union) and the
respective Member State. The agreement shall also set out the future relationship of that State
with the Union. It shall be concluded on behalf of the Union by the Council, acting by a qualified
majority, after obtaining the consent of the European Parliament. ‘The Treaties [TEU and TFEU]
shall cease to apply to the State in question from the date of entry into force of the withdrawal
agreement or, failing that, two years after the notification referred to in [Art 50(2)], unless the
European Council, in agreement with the Member State concerned, unanimously decides to extend
this period’ (Art 50(3)). For the purposes of these provisions, the UK shall not participate in the
discussions of the European Council or Council representing it or in decisions concerning it (Art
50(4)). A qualified majority shall be defined in accordance with Art 238(3)(b) TFEU. Such
majority requires at least 72% of the members of the Council representing the participating
Member States, comprising at least 65 % of the population of these States. At least 72% of 27
Member States (without the UK) means at least 19 Member States. Germany’s population
comprises 18.30%, France’s 14.97%, Italy’s 13.70%, Spain’s 10.47%, and Poland’s 8.57% of
these 27 Member States. No agreement can be concluded against the vote of Germany and France
and any one of these three other Member States acting together.
What is the interest of the UK, and what might be its negotiation strategy against this
background? The referendum vote is not the legal declaration required by Art 50(2) TEU. It is a
political mandate to issue that declaration and negotiate a Brexit agreement. Assuming that the
UK government in fact plans to follow this mandate, it would be prudent to wait some time before
formally initiating the process. The UK might even attempt to negotiate a Brexit agreement in the
shadow of a non-declared wish to exit and issue that declaration only once the agreement has been
finalized. It would be prudent to wait some time before issuing the Art 50(2) declaration because,
for domestic political reasons, a new government under a new leadership should be negotiating
Brexit given that the current one has favoured remain, and it takes some time to accomplish a
cabinet reshuffle and sort out the domestic political upheaval. It might be considered clever to
postpone the formal exit request as long as possible given that this declaration triggers the twoyear negotiation period. The UK clearly has an interest to negotiate Brexit on the most favourable
terms, i.e. to conclude an agreement that secures as many benefits of the internal market for the
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UK as possible while minimising the costs associated with this. However, if it formally declares
its wish to leave and no such agreement can be negotiated and agreed (which will be difficult), it
will be out without an agreement – the worst possible outcome. Hence, it does not come as a
surprise that Mr Cameron has announced that he will not resign immediately but only in October
and that the Brexit negotiations will need to be led by his successor.
Page | 25

At first sight, it appears that the Union cannot force the UK to issue the formal exit
declaration required by Art 50(2) for the start of the Brexit negotiations. The Union appears
powerless. But the UK cannot force the Union to negotiate in the shadow of a non-declared desire
to exit either, and the Union has made already clear that it is not going to do this. What is more,
any Brexit agreement will need the consent of the European Parliament and a qualified majority
in the Council. A qualified majority in the Council against the vote of Germany and France
realistically cannot be obtained. So the UK faces the prospect of Brexit without an agreement if it
antagonises the larger remaining Member States and/or the European Parliament. In fact, on 25
June, the foreign ministers of the six founding Member States of the Union pressured the UK to
formally initiate the process speedily, and on 26 June Mr Schulz, the president of the European
Parliament, called upon Mr Cameron to do so on occasion of the next Council meeting on 28
June. Further, on 27 June, the German chancellor Ms Merkel is meeting with Mr Hollande and
Mr Renzi, representing the most simple ‘blocking coalition’ for any deal negotiated with the
UK. If these three leaders prompt the UK to come forward with an exit declaration in the near
future, they are sending a strong strategic signal: if you wait until October or even longer, you
should not hope to convince us of a withdrawal agreement that is favourable to you.
Hence, it appears that the UK finds itself in a precarious position. Mr Cameron might have
once more overplayed his hand in suggesting that the Article 50(2) declaration can and will
wait. On the other hand, the political turmoil in the UK is significant enough already. What will
happen to the country if indeed Mr Cameron reverses his decision and comes forward with the
declaration soon, possibly already on the next Council meeting on 28 June? All the bargaining
leverage is on the Union’s side, and it does not seem like the Brexit negotiations will leave room
for a lot of potential cherry-picking on the UK’s part.
The strategic picture is complicated by the fact that the interests of the remaining Member
States are not homogenous. Export-oriented countries such as Germany that have more to lose
from the UK being cut off the internal market have an interest in concluding a withdrawal
agreement that gives the UK and themselves a ‘good deal’. However, it is difficult to see how
such cherry-picking can be accomplished. Surely any deal will be scrutinised in detail by all
interested parties. Giving the UK a special deal is almost impossible without setting undesirable
incentives for other Member States to free ride on any such deal. And while Germany, France and
other larger Member States may be able to block any deal that is not in their interests, they cannot
force a deal tailored to their interests on the other Member States. Remember that 65% in terms
of the population is the required majority. Everybody knows this, and ex ante this works as a
commitment strategy that again weakens the UK bargaining position: the Union will not cut a deal
that is not acceptable to a broad majority of the remaining Member States. And if there is no deal,
there is exit without a deal.
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Finally, the ensuing negotiations are interesting also because they are going to involve
agents. The Union already has announced that its negotiation team will be led by a Belgian
diplomat, Mr Seeuws. Mr Seeuws was chief-of-staff to Mr Van Rompuy, Mr Tusk’s predecessor
as chairman of EU summits, until 2014. He is an experienced negotiator and also a strong advocate
of deeper EU integration. This sends a clear signal to the UK also with respect to what sort of
‘withdrawal agreement’ to expect: not one that weakens the Union, e.g. by cherry-picking Page | 26
elements. Even more important, Mr Seeuws does not represent one of the large Member States
with more economic and political power. This gives Germany and France in particular more
flexibility in the negotiations and is less prone to being viewed as an expression of ‘bully politics’
than if, like in the Greek bailout negotiations, it would have been Ms Merkel or Mr Schäuble, the
German Finance Minister, who had been designated as the lead negotiator.
I think it is fair to say that the Brexit vote is seen by a majority of non-British citizens as
being bad for Europe, but bad for the UK in particular. Right now, it appears that the negotiation
table is not laid out such that the dire consequences of the vote could be much improved for the
UK. Simply put, the rules of the ‘exit game’ put the UK in a very weak bargaining position: if a
‘withdrawal agreement’ is not backed by a broad majority of the remaining Member States, the
UK faces Brexit ‘pure and simple’. It will find itself outside of the Union with the right to apply
for re-entry according to Article 49 (Art 50(5)). It will be in a club with Turkey.

Date of Publication: 27 June 2016
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A New Referendum is a Constitutional Requirement
PAVLOS ELEFTHERIADIS
The most recent primary legislation on the relations between the European Union and the United
Kingdom is the European Union Act 2011. This Act, who some scholars called at the time an
‘unprecedented constitutional experiment’ is known for the fact that it establishes a very unusual
‘referendum lock’ before an amendment of the EU Treaties can be ratified by the UK. It introduces
a rule that all serious amendments of the EU treaties will have to be approved both by an Act of
Parliament and by the electorate in a referendum. The intention behind that Act was to make sure
that the UK had thought long and hard before participating in further EU integration. The Act was
seen as controversial among lawyers, because it changed the ‘manner and form’ in which the
sovereignty of parliament is exercised.
In my view, the Act adds an important dimension to the debate about the effects of the EU
referendum of June 23. The 2011 Act has been written in such an expansive way as to encompass,
in my view, not only treaties that amend the EU treaties, but also treaties that the UK is due to
enter as a result of withdrawing from it. This may be a surprising suggestion, because the drafters
of the 2011 Act probably had not thought about this prospect. Nevertheless, the Act is to be applied
on the basis of what it says, not on the basis of what its drafters were thinking at the time. On the
basis of the words on the page, a new referendum is most likely legally necessary before the UK
withdraws from the EU.
The argument is simple. The 2011 Act provides at section 2(1) that it applies to a ‘treaty
which amends or replaces’ the EU treaties. Treaties that ‘amend’ the EU treaties affect, of course,
only members of the EU. The treaty between the EU and the withdrawing UK will not amend the
main treaties, namely the TEU and the TFEU (a separate treaty among the remaining 27 will have
to do that). But, as we saw, the Act, in its attempt to include perhaps everything about the EU,
covers also those treaties that ‘replace’ the EU treaties. What does ‘replace’ mean? ‘Replacing’ is
something different from ‘amending’. Because it is different, it must be something different from
the ordinary amendment of the current EU treaties. It is therefore obvious that a new treaty between
the withdrawing UK and the remaining EU could be one ‘replacing’ the European treaties, at least
as far as the UK is concerned. It is a treaty that replaces the UK’s rights and obligations towards
the EU.
This conclusion is strengthened by the fact that the Act defines (in section 1(4)) part of
what it means by ‘amends’. There is no definition at all, however, of what is meant by ‘replaces’,
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which is left entirely open. It is therefore clearly plausible that both a withdrawal agreement that
the UK will agree with the EU under Article 50 (the ‘withdrawal agreement’) and an in principle
separate (and hopefully contemporaneous) future trade relations agreement (‘the trade agreement’)
will be treaties that ‘replace’ the EU treaties as far as the UK is concerned. This is because all the
rights and duties of the UK towards the EU would be replaced by the rights and duties created by
the withdrawal agreement and the trade agreement. If this is the case, then both these agreements Page | 28
will fall under the scope of the 2011 Act.
Not all agreements require a referendum according to the 2011 Act. Section 4 of the Act
outlines a list of cases where a new treaty that in principle falls under the scope of the Act ‘attracts
a referendum’. If any one of the conditions mentioned there is met, a referendum is required.
These conditions are very broad, perhaps excessively so. It is likely that those who drafted them
did not have in mind a treaty that is part of a process of withdrawal from the EU. Most likely, they
had in mind its opposite, a treaty bringing further integration. But the words mean what they say.
Any court will have to give effect to them as they are in the statute book.
This was clearly the intention of the government at the time. Introducing the Second
Reading of the Bill for this Act in the House of Lords Lord Howell of Guildford (who was then
Minister of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office) said about section 4: ‘The Government
make no apology for the complexity of the provisions. We want to make it clear for Parliament,
the British people and, indeed, our EU partners and the EU as a whole where a referendum would
be required under the Bill. We feel that a short, vague statement would leave any future decisions
more open to challenge in Parliament and the courts’. So every one of these detailed provisions
was carefully thought out.
The most obviously relevant cases seem to me to be in paragraphs 4(1)(i) and 4(1)(j),
although others may also prove relevant:
(i) the conferring on an EU institution or body of power to impose a requirement or obligation on
the United Kingdom, or the removal of any limitation on any such power of an institution or body;
(j) the conferring on an EU institution or body of new or extended power to impose sanctions on
the United Kingdom.
The conditions do not refer to the balance of power or any arrangement of reciprocity. They are
triggered if an EU institution or body is given the power to impose a single ‘requirement’ or
‘obligation’ on the UK, or if any limitation on existing powers is removed. They are also met if an
EU institution or body is given the power to impose ‘sanctions’ on the UK.
Whether these tests of section 4 will be met by a future UK/EU treaty on withdrawal and
future access to the single market depends on what those treaties will say. But it is in my view
highly likely that at least one of these very broad tests will be met by any treaty creating reciprocal
obligations in the process of withdrawing from the EU and establishing a future trading deal. For
example, a withdrawal agreement will certainly impose obligations on the UK regarding EU
citizens currently in the UK. This is especially so if the UK decides to replace its membership in
the EU with membership of the EEA. As is well understood by now, being a member of the EEA
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involves accepting the rules of the single market without voting for them at the Council. So the
test of section 4(i) will be met in both its limbs, because by virtue of the EEA agreement EU
institutions will have been conferred a new power to impose requirements on the UK, while the
UK will have lost both its power to vote in the Council and its right to bring an action to the Court
of Justice against an institution of the EU regarding these obligations.
For different reasons, the tests of section 4 (i) and (j) may also be met by a bilateral treaty
or set of bilateral treaties between the UK and the EU (the ‘Swiss’ model). First, among other
things, any such agreements will most likely remove the protection that the UK currently enjoys
not to be discriminated against by virtue of 18 TFEU. The agreement will thus remove a
‘limitation’ on the powers of EU institutions. Second, any new treaties will almost certainly create
powers in bodies or institutions of the EU to impose a requirement or obligation on the UK
(paragraph i) or even create some form of sanctions (paragraph j) as in the WTO model of judicial
panels, or by way of arbitration.
They will do so, most likely, in international and not in EU law, but the Act does not draw
such a distinction. It says, for example, that what matters is the conferring of ‘power’ not ‘power
in EU law’. And if this applies to the set of bilateral treaties, it is also likely to apply to the WTO
option as well.
Of course I am only summarising here issues that will require full and detailed
consideration, if and when these treaties take shape. But the literal reading of the 2011 Act suggests
that the tests are wide-ranging and therefore the threshold for meeting them is low. And, if any one
of the tests of s.4 is met, a new referendum will be required by law. In short, because the scope of
the 2011 Act is so wide and because it requires a referendum practically whenever there is any
change in the allocation of powers in the relation between the EU and the UK, by changing these
powers in the process of withdrawal, a new treaty or treaties between the withdrawing UK and the
remaining EU will almost certainly meet some of the tests of the 2011 Act. This was not perhaps
the intention of the drafters, but this will not matter (under the well-established Pepper v Hart
criteria) where the meaning of a provision is clear.
If this argument – or a version of it - is correct, then it follows that practically any new
agreement with the EU as a result of the EU referendum will have to be approved by a new
referendum. Of course, the current government – if it could secure a majority in Parliament – could
seek to enact new legislation to abolish the 2011 Act (or perhaps try to ignore it, relying on a rival
account of parliamentary sovereignty). This is a feature of the omnipotence of our Parliament. But
the retrospective change of the law will be seen as obviously self-serving, and as something
offensive to the rule of law. The current government had a chance to address these issues when it
secured the enactment of the European Union Referendum Act 2015. The terms of the referendum
were set then by the current parliamentary majority. To retrospectively change these terms after
the referendum has taken place in order to circumvent the legal obligation of a second referendum,
will be rightly seen as constitutionally inappropriate. When the referendum was called, the
obligation to hold a second referendum was already in the statute book.
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I conclude that a proposed new treaty between the UK and the EU that seeks to replace EU
membership with a set of new trade agreements will most likely have to be approved by way of a
new referendum according to the framework created by the 2011 Act. The only secure way to
avoid such a referendum is not to enter into any new treaty with the EU at all. This would entail
that the UK would leave unilaterally, without regard for future trade and in very bad terms. This,
however, is an unthinkable scenario, one to bring certain economic disaster for the UK and one Page | 30
that has not been contemplated by the leave campaign or the government.
So what would a new referendum decide? The question would be about the proposed new
treaty or set of treaties with the EU, which would have been agreed after a lengthy and probably
laborious process as the best possible deal available to the UK. If the answer to this referendum is
affirmative to the new treaty, then the new agreement replacing membership of the EU with
another type of relationship will have been approved and will take effect. But if the answer is ‘no’
to the new agreement, then the status quo, namely continuing membership of the EU, will have
received a renewed mandate by the electorate as a preferable state of affairs to the best available
alternative. The electorate would have chosen to remain. At that point the government would have
to revoke the Article 50 notification and the UK would continue being a member of the EU.

Date of Publication: 4 July 2016
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How Brexit will Fail
PAVLOS ELEFTHERIADIS
If Brexit fails, it will do so because withdrawal happens suddenly and with no indication about the
future arrangements that will replace membership in the EU. In this short note, I explain how this
process is likely to unfold. It may still succeed. It may be that, as the current United Kingdom
government hopes, Britain will become a leading trading nation outside the European Union,
without political and social friction and without going through a painful economic downturn.
For Brexit to succeed, we need a period of transition to the new trade environment. A
smooth withdrawal from the EU should allow time for the UK to negotiate protection for London
and for financial and related services (which may in the end prove unachievable), to secure the
unfettered access of some key industries (eg car manufacturing) to the single market and for deals
to be struck with the rest of the world (see for example the informative statement from the City of
London Corporation). Special negotiations will be needed to clarify the position in Scotland and
Northern Ireland. In any event, all relevant businesses, workers and organisations should know
well in advance if they are to lose their EU rights and prepare for change. The problem is that there
is no time for any of these things to be achieved.
A great deal of the legal commentary so far has focused on the power of the Government
to give notification of withdrawal. The process, regulated by Article 50 of the TEU, envisages that
a withdrawal agreement ought to be concluded within two year from that notification. If it is not,
and if the member states do not, unanimously, decide to extend that period, then the UK will be
automatically out of the EU. The question whether the notification needs parliamentary approval
or not was heard at a three-day hearing at the High Court a few days ago. A decision is currently
imminent.
Nevertheless, this discussion has obscured another more important point. Withdrawal,
with an agreement or without, is only one piece of the puzzle. It is not the most important. The key
to Brexit is the agreement between the UK and the EU after withdrawal, setting out their future
trade relations. This ‘trade agreement’ will determine if London banks can do business in the EU,
whether British cars will be subject to customs formalities and tariffs, or whether persons will need
visas to travel and work in Europe. Such issues will not be resolved by the withdrawal agreement
envisaged by Article 50. The trade agreement is a separate agreement to the withdrawal agreement.
It is made by a different process and has different content.
The trade agreement, for example, requires unanimity, not majority support, as provided for the
withdrawal agreement in Article 50. If the trade agreement includes services – which it must, if it
is to protect the ‘passport’ rights of the London financial institutions, it will be a ‘mixed’
agreement, covering ground that goes outside the exclusive competence on external trade enjoyed
by the EU. It will therefore also require ratification by national parliaments of the 27 remaining
member states of the EU. This takes a lot of time and has uncertain outcomes (as shown by the
Canadian trade deal debacle with Belgium). While the trade agreement could (under the treaties)
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take effect even before it is fully ratified, it is highly unlikely that it will be concluded within two
years, at least judging from the experience of similar deals with other third countries.
The distinction between the withdrawal agreement and the trade agreement has been
obscured by the assumption – or, rather, the hope – that the two will be concluded simultaneously
and will in practice be taken to be the same thing. But there is no guarantee that they will be Page | 32
concluded at the same time. Quite the contrary: it is near impossible that they will be so concluded,
given the UK government’s recent pronouncements.
If they cannot be concluded at the same time, then withdrawal will take place without any
trade deal at all. It can happen either through the conclusion (by majority in the Council and the
consent of the European Parliament) of the withdrawal agreement under Article 50, or through the
automatic exit at the end of the two years in the event that an agreement is not reached. This is
what is likely to happen in the spring of 2019. But if withdrawal happens without a trade agreement
in place, then the minimum WTO rules will apply at once.
Is a temporary agreement bridging the gap between withdrawal and a new trade deal a
realistic prospect? It is not, for legal reasons. Having the UK enter the EEA for a temporary period
of time will require the UK and the EU concluding treaties with themselves and with all the
members of the EEA. This would require ratification by all parties. Negotiating, signing and
ratifying such an agreement cannot realistically be done within two years.
Could, instead, the UK’s membership be scaled down for a transitional period? This would
require amending the EU treaties, which is politically impossible, and in any event requires
ratification by all member states of the EU, a process that also will take longer than two years.
Such a treaty, by the way, would clearly engage the EU Act 2011 in the UK, which requires a
referendum before an EU treaty amendment is ratified – so would require a second referendum on
Brexit, which the government does not seem to want. So, given the nature of the UK’s treaty
obligations, a temporary arrangement seems to me as difficult to conclude as any permanent one.
In the absence of a temporary arrangement or a permanent trade deal, the UK will thus exit
the single market at once. The relevant tariffs under that WTO framework were collected by the
UK government in the chart below (prepared in the course of the Referendum campaign):
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What does this mean? The financial services industry will have lost access to the single
market at once. British products will have lost their immediate access to the single market and will
be subject to formalities and tariffs. Immigration controls will have been fully re-introduced for
UK nationals in the EU and for EU nationals in the UK. The economy will experience a sudden
shock, with unknown consequences. We will not know if this is a permanent or a temporary
arrangement, because this will depend on the – uncertain –possibility of a future trade agreement.
The political aspect of the process is unpredictable, but it is likely that a blame game will
start on both sides. The UK government will blame the EU for holding it hostage and causing
hardship out of vindictiveness. EU leaders will reciprocate by saying ‘we told you so’. Anti-EU
fever in the UK will rise in direct proportion to the economic hardship caused by the loss of access
to the single market. Nationalism will deliver electoral success to the most populist ticket, either
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with Mrs May or another anti-EU leader in the 2020 general election. This is unlikely to be the
start of a smooth process. This is, I think, what a failed Brexit looks like. It will be a time of rising
anger, economic uncertainty, intense hardship and political instability.
For the unravelling to be avoided, we need a smooth transition to the new trade regime.
But the reality is that it could only happen if the UK was ready to accept an extension of time. Page | 34
Negotiations must last longer if the trade agreement is to be ready at the point of withdrawal. Is
this politically possible? In Mrs May’s thinking, it seems not. The Prime Minister has said inexplicably, since she supported ‘Remain’ herself - that exiting the EU is a way for the UK to
regain its ‘sovereignty’. It is now a matter of great principle. She has stressed that everything needs
to happen quickly, so as not to compromise the ‘democratic will’ of the British people. Withdrawal
seems set for 2019 – a year before the general election.
This is then how Brexit will fail. Either through panic, or though inertia, or through
incompetence, the UK will leave the EU exactly two years after giving notification. There will be
no temporary deal, no permanent trade deal and no indication of a likelihood of such a deal. The
UK will leave the single market quickly, without any period of transition, without giving anyone
time to adjust, and without the hope of return.
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EU Prospectus Regulation: Some Out-of-the-Box Thinking
LUCA ENRIQUES
One of the core initiatives of the European Commission’s plan for a Capital Markets Union is its
proposal to replace the existing legal framework for public offerings with a new regulation. The
new regulation would bring some incremental changes to the existing framework, mainly in the
direction of: (a) lowering the burdens for issuers (via broader exemptions for secondary
offerings, an attempt to increase the use of shelf registration, and simplified prospectuses for small
issuers); and (b) making prospectuses more retail investor-friendly (via shorter summaries and
limits on the use of risk factors).
Both the ultimate rationale of the existing framework (“a high level of consumer and
investor protection”) and its building blocks would remain the same. Chief among them are, first,
the idea of a prospectus to be drafted pursuant to detailed schedules identifying required
disclosures item by item with a view to “removing asymmetries of information between
[investors] and issuers;” second, pre-approval of the prospectus by competent authorities with a
view to ensuring that the prospectus is complete, consistent and comprehensible.
It is a mystery why policymakers keep deluding themselves with the idea that issuer
disclosure is a useful tool to protect retail investors. While reasonable minds may differ on whether
mandatory disclosure does enhance the efficiency of capital markets by reducing the costs
securities analysts and sophisticated investors have to bear in order to acquire and process the
information they need for their investment decisions, a strong and convincing body of evidence
exists showing that retail investors are unable to make better investment decisions by processing
available information about an issuer (for a summary of the evidence see eg N Moloney, How to
Protect Investors 291-96 (CUP, 2010)).
Policymakers, including in the EU, should explicitly recognize that, generally speaking,
mandatory disclosure performs three different roles in three different contexts, as John Armour,
Dan Awrey, Paul Davies, Jeffrey Gordon, Colin Mayer, Jennifer Payne and I argue in the book
Principles of Financial Regulation (OUP, forthcoming). First, when an offer is made with a view
to having securities admitted to trading on a regulated market (ie, in IPOs), mandating disclosure
may only serve the purpose of laying down once and for all the information items that sophisticated
buyers and investment analysts would anyway deem necessary in order to price the securities.
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Retail investors are not users of issuer disclosures in this context. Rather, they free ride on the
mechanisms (usually in the form of the bookbuilding process) that lead to setting an IPO price
reflecting available information. Second, when a bank or another financial intermediary places
securities among clients without a proper parallel placement among institutional investors,
mandatory disclosure’s function is to provide investors with information which they may find Page | 36
useful, rather than to support investment decisions, as a basis for legal redress in case of misselling. Finally, for “fringe” offerings directly marketed to the investing public, the mandatory
disclosure process, coupled with pre-approval of the prospectus, may serve the function of
screening for fraud and amateurish initiatives (more likely the latter: given the relatively generous
exemptions regime within the EU, fraudsters are unlikely to be caught by prospectus rules
anyway).
If this framework holds, a more cost-effective way to reshape prospectus regulations would
be the following. First of all, for IPOs (and non-exempt secondary offerings marketed in a similar
way):
1. a requirement that the price of the offer to the public will be no higher than the price set for
the offering reserved to institutional investors should be introduced (it is currently just a best
practice within the EU);
2. required disclosures should cover the kind of information that securities analysts find relevant
rather than working out the information needs of a mythological non-professional
prospectus reader;
3. unlike in the current framework and in the Commission’s proposal, there should be no need for:
a. mandating the inclusion in the prospectus of a summary, let alone for detailing its
scope, length and contents;
b. prescribing which risk factors should be highlighted and which should be omitted;
c. laying out detailed rules on how to publish the prospectus;
d. imposing any language requirement for prospectuses.
Getting rid of the seemingly minor requirements referred to under (3) would reduce issuers’
administrative costs, in addition to reducing their liability risk.1 In other words, a similar regime
would be even more consistent with the goal of “mak[ing] markets work more efficiently and

1

A 2008 report commissioned by the European Commission estimated the administrative costs of preparing a
prospectus for equity offerings at above €900,000; unsurprisingly, the European Banking Federation’s response to the
2015 European Commission consultation on the Prospectus Directive review came up with a higher estimate, ranging
from €1.8m to €2.5m for an IPO prospectus. Of course, the requirements mentioned above account for only a fraction
of the costs of preparing a prospectus, but for smaller issuers even such a fraction could be a non-trivial expense.
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offer[ing] investors and savers additional opportunities to put their money at work”, as the
preamble to the prospectus regulation proposal reads.
A more controversial step, and most likely a political non-starter in the present regulatory
climate, would be to move away from imposing itemized disclosure and securities regulators’ prePage | 37
approval of the prospectus, based on the argument that in IPO markets there is little role to play
for these regulatory tools. In fact, one may wonder what the added value is of these regulatory
requirements in a system where professional buyers are used to receiving a wealth of information
and will want to continue receiving it: they will simply refuse to deal with (or discount securities
offered by) an issuer omitting price-sensitive information. Underwriters themselves will make sure
that such information is given.
No significant change is suggested here for direct “fringe” offerings, for which the risks of
unscrupulous or outright fraudulent behaviour are high enough to make disclosure requirements a
useful barrier to entry. But for offerings that are exclusively placed via banks and other regulated
intermediaries relying on wide customer networks a good deal of simplification should be possible:
here, it is the case that no reputation intermediary is available (in the case of self-placed products)
and/or that no independent and sophisticated market players are involved in the pricing of the
securities. The EU should not look too far for a better solution: key information documents (KIDs)
similar to those required for PRIIPs would be suitable also for other bank-placed (non-structured)
securities. While views may differ on the usefulness of KIDs as a tool for retail clients’ investment
decisions, a shorter document focusing on the financial instrument’s characteristics and risks
would make more sense than the pointlessly bulky prospectuses currently required. The
document’s focus, as hinted before, should be on the investment features that are relevant to assess
whether the selling intermediary has violated conduct of business regulations, such as the
suitability rule or rules on conflicts of interest, and thereby mis-sold the financial product.
To conclude, the Commission’s proposal, while overall moving in the direction of reducing
compliance costs, still reflects the misconception that disclosure regulation can help retail
investors. Abandoning this misconception would allow for bolder steps in the direction of
modernizing EU securities markets and facilitating capital raisings within the EU.
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